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DON’T STOP THE CLOCK: WHY 
EQUITABLE TOLLING SHOULD NOT BE 
READ INTO THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
Abstract: Article 12 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of In-
ternational Child Abduction allows an abducting parent to avoid the re-
turn of the child if the parent can show that more than a year has passed 
since the wrongful removal or retention of the child, and that the child is 
well settled in his or her new environment. In cases where concealment of 
the abducted child prevented a parent from filing a claim within one year 
of the abduction, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits have applied equitable tolling to delay the start of the temporal 
limitation. More recently, however, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First 
and Second Circuits have rejected the application of equitable tolling. The 
U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments on this issue in December 2013. 
This Note argues that the text, drafting history, and underlying purposes 
of the Convention fail to support the application of equitable tolling. It 
then explains that the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits applied equitable toll-
ing to the Convention—despite a lack of support for doing so—because 
they adhered to the American legal tradition of placing the rights of par-
ents ahead of the rights and interests of children. Ultimately, this Note 
recommends that the Supreme Court reject the application of equitable 
tolling and instead instruct lower courts to consider the child’s conceal-
ment as part of their analysis of whether the child is well settled in his or 
her new environment. This proposed approach is consistent with the text 
and underlying goals of the Convention, and—like the application of eq-
uitable tolling—will work to deter child abductions. 
Introduction 
 Estelle Bocquet and Kamal Ouzid had a child together in Miami, 
Florida in 1996.1 The couple lived with their child, Noe, in Miami from 
1996 to 1998.2 In 1999, Bocquet returned to France and enrolled Noe 
in a French preschool.3 The family lived together in France until Au-
                                                                                                                      
1 Bocquet v. Ouzid, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2002). Bocquet is a French 
citizen and Ouzid is an Algerian citizen. Id. 
2 Id. at 1341. 
3 Id. Noe was going to start school in September, but Ouzid took him on several trips, 
and as a result Noe did not start until December 1999. Id. 
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gust 2000.4 Then, one day, Bocquet returned home from work to find 
that Ouzid had taken Noe to Algeria.5 Bocquet quickly filed a com-
plaint with the police, and attempted to exercise her custodial rights 
through a French-Algerian Treaty.6 Bocquet also tried to visit her son in 
Algeria, but Ouzid and his family refused to help her obtain the neces-
sary visa.7 Bocquet finally obtained a visa to visit Algeria, but Ouzid left 
for America with Noe on the same day that Bocquet arrived in Algeria.8 
After more than a year without seeing her child, Bocquet travelled to 
Miami in October 2001 and Ouzid finally allowed her to have a super-
vised visit with Noe.9 In March 2002, Bocquet obtained a French di-
vorce decree that awarded her sole custody of Noe.10 With this decree 
in hand, Bocquet filed a petition in an American court under the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion (Convention), which allows a court to order the prompt return of 
a child who has been removed in violation of a foreign custody order.11 
Accordingly, Bocquet was finally allowed to advocate for the return of 
her child, but more than a year after his removal.12 
 Bocquet’s agonizing experience is one of many cases that illustrate 
the human aspect that prompted both the adoption of the Convention 
and the decision of the United States to ratify it.13 Despite the Conven-
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 1341–42. 
6 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. Because Algeria is not a party to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention), Bocquet was 
unable to rely on its provisions. See Status Table 28: Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, http:// 
www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
7 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (explaining that in order for a non-Algerian to ob-
tain an Algerian visa, an Algerian landowner must extend an invitation). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. Bocquet was allowed to visit with Noe over a period of ten days. Id. These visits 
were permitted only in public places and in the presence of Ouzid. Id. During the month 
leading up to the visits, Ouzid and the former couple’s mutual friends continued to refuse 
to give her Noe and Ouzid’s address. Id. 
10 Id. at 1343. 
11 See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, pmbl., 
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 [hereinafter Convention]; Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 
1343. 
12 See Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1343. 
13 See Convention, supra note 11, at 1. The Convention was unanimously passed at the 
Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. Elisa Pérez-Vera, 
Explanatory Report, in Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session 426 (Permanent 
Bureau trans., 1981). The Convention became enforceable in the United States on July 1, 
1988. See Convention, supra note 11, at 1. The Convention was officially codified by Congress 
through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”). 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–
11611 (2006). 
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tion’s goal of deterring the wrongful removal of children, under nor-
mal circumstances Bocquet would have no recourse available because 
of an exception found in Article 12 of the Convention that was avail-
able to Ouzid: the well-settled defense.14 Under the well-settled de-
fense, a court may refuse to return a child if the respondent shows by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the petition was filed more 
than a year after the alleged wrongful removal; and (2) the child is set-
tled in his or her new environment.15 This defense recognizes that the 
swift return of a child following a prolonged absence, without a judicial 
review of the merits of the custody claims, may not always be in the 
child’s best interests.16 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite the fact that Noe was retained in violation of Bocquet’s 
custodial rights for more than a year before Bocquet filed her petition 
under the Convention, in 2002 in Bocquet v. Ouzid, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida held that the well-settled de-
fense should not apply to Noe’s abduction because of the doctrine of 
equitable tolling.17 Guided by this doctrine, the court concluded that 
the one-year period under the well-settled defense should not start un-
til the date when Bocquet learned of Noe’s address in the United 
States.18 As such, the court determined that Bocquet’s petition had 
been filed within the one-year period, and therefore Ouzid was barred 
from raising the well-settled defense.19 
 Equitable tolling can render inapplicable the well-settled defense 
simply by manipulating the timing of the case, rather than determining 
whether or not the child is well settled.20 Because the application of 
equitable tolling manipulates the start of the one-year clock, it eviscer-
 
14 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. This Note refers to this defense as the “well-settled 
defense” or the “Article 12 defense,” though it is also known as the “settled defense” or 
“now-settled defense.” 
15 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, art. 12. 
16 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458. 
17 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (citing Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 
1998) (noting that the district court had applied equitable tolling because it could not 
imagine a federal statute that did not apply such a doctrine in situations where the wrong-
doer’s actions caused the delay in the commencement of proceedings); see infra notes 79–
81 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of equitable tolling). 
18 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., id. Of course, in some situations, even if a court equitably tolls the one-year 
period until the petitioner discovers the child, the petitioner’s filing could still be un-
timely. See Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding that 
equitable tolling was inapplicable, but noting that even if the doctrine were applicable, the 
petition would still be untimely because it was filed more than a year after the discovery of 
the child’s whereabouts). 
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ates the purpose of the well-settled defense: to leave in place children 
who have been living in their new environment for over one year.21 The 
Bocquet court reasoned---as have other American courts---that without 
equitable tolling, the well-settled defense would serve to encourage the 
concealment of abducted children.22 The Bocquet court also joined 
some of its sister courts in analogizing the one-year period to a statute 
of limitations, and noted that equitable tolling is traditionally read into 
federal statutes containing such limitations.23 Accordingly, these courts 
placed the deterrence of wrongful removal, and therefore the custodial 
rights of the left-behind parent, above the interests of the abducted 
child in maintaining the stability of his or her new environment.24 
 Although courts are well-intentioned in adopting this approach to 
the well-settled defense, other courts are critical of the application of 
equitable tolling in such cases.25 These latter courts have reasoned that 
the drafters of the Convention unambiguously included the one-year 
time period in recognition that it might be in the best interest of the 
child to remain with the abducting parent when he or she has lived in 
                                                                                                                      
21 See infra notes 121--140 and accompanying text. 
22 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348; see Font Paulus v. Vittini Cordero, No. 3:12-cv-986, 
2012 WL 2524772, at *7–8 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2012); Habrzyk v. Habrzyk, 759 F. Supp. 2d 
1014, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Gatica v. Martinez, No. 10-21750-CIV, 2010 WL 6744790, at *7 
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2010); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 2007 WL 
2071957, at *6--7 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2007); Gonzalez v. Nashor Lurashi, No. Civ.04-
1276(HL), 2004 WL 1202729, at *11 (D.P.R. May 20, 2004); In re Ahumada Cabrera v. 
Lozano, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 
553, 563 (D. Md. 2003); Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1362 
(M.D. Fla. 2002). 
23 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348; see Font Paulus, 2012 WL 2524772, at *7; Gatica, 
2010 WL 6744790, at *7; In re Ahumada Cabrera, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1313; Mendez Lynch, 220 
F. Supp. 2d at 1362–63. Alternatively, some courts have applied equitable tolling while 
explicitly rejecting the argument that the one-year period is similar to a statute of limita-
tions. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2004 WL 1202729, at *11; Belay, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
24 See infra notes 141--172 and accompanying text (discussing how American courts ap-
ply equitable tolling to protect parental custody rights at the expense of children’s rights 
and interests). 
25 See, e.g., Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12–15 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting the lack of support 
for equitable tolling in the Convention’s text, drafting history, and decisions of sister signato-
ries); Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51--54 (2d. Cir. 2012) (noting the lack of support in both 
the text of the Convention and the drafting history of the well-settled defense), cert. granted, 
81 U.S.L.W. 3696 ( June 24, 2013) (No. 12-820); Nunez v. Ramirez, No. CV 07-01205-PHX-
EHC, 2008 WL 898658, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008); Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 
4259(PKC), 2007 WL 2600862, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007); Anderson, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 
875. During the drafting period of the Convention, the United States was unsuccessful in 
seeking the inclusion of multiple time limits. See Merle H. Weiner, Uprooting Children in the 
Name of Equity, 33 Fordham Int’l L.J. 409, 437 (2010). The United States also pushed for an 
eighteen-month time limit, but this proposal was also rejected. See id. 
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this new environment for such a long time.26 To justify this conclusion, 
courts have noted the lack of support for equitable tolling in the Con-
vention’s text and its drafting history.27 Moreover, these courts have 
explained that the analogy to a statute of limitations is inapt because 
unlike in the case of a statute of limitations—in which a person’s right 
to redress is terminated at the statute’s expiration date—the Conven-
tion continues to require the return of the child after the one-year pe-
riod expires.28 The goals of the Convention, and the interests of chil-
dren like Noe, would be better served by a more thorough application 
of the second prong of the well-settled defense: the inquiry into 
whether the child is settled in his or her new environment.29 The sec-
ond prong of the defense allows for a more probing analysis of what is 
in the best interests of the child in a manner that is both faithful to the 
Convention’s texts and goals, and, like the application of equitable toll-
ing, should deter the concealment of children.30 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite the good intentions of the courts that apply equitable toll-
ing to the well-settled defense, courts should ultimately not read equi-
table tolling into the Convention.31 The text and the drafting history 
directly contradict the application of this doctrine to the well-settled 
defense.32 In applying this doctrine, courts have prioritized the inter-
ests of the left-behind parent over the interests of the child.33 The 
proper balance of both the parent’s and the child’s interests, however, 
is already provided for in the second prong of the Convention’s well-
 
26 Nunez, 2008 WL 898658, at *6; Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12; Anderson, 250 F. 
Supp. 2d at 875; Toren v. Toren, 26 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (D. Mass. 1998), vacated, 191 F.3d 
23 (1st Cir. 1999). 
27 See Nunez, 2008 WL 898658, at *6 (noting the drafters’ clear intent to include the 
one-year period); Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12 (describing the drafters’ considera-
tion of alternatives to the one-year period, but recognizing their ultimate decision to in-
clude the temporal limitation); Anderson, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (noting both the absence 
of language in the Convention supporting the application of equitable tolling and the 
clear intent of the drafters to include a single time limit). 
28 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12–16; Lozano,697 F.3d at 52; Nunez, 2008 WL 898658, at *6; 
Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at *12; Anderson, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 875; Toren, 26 F. Supp. 2d 
at 244. Additionally, in 2013 in Yaman v. Yaman, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Hampshire declined to adopt the analogy to a statute of limitations because the pre-
sumption for equitable tolling applies to statutes, not international treaties. 919 F. Supp. 
2d 189, 196--97 (D.N.H. 2013), aff’d, 730 F.3d 1(1st Cir. 2013). 
29 See infra notes 210--221 and accompanying text. 
30 See Convention, supra note 11, art. 12; infra notes 202--262 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 210--262 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 106--120 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 152--201 and accompanying text. 
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settled defense: the settled inquiry.34 By allowing courts to decide cases 
on their merits in the context of the settled inquiry, this process will 
deter child abductions and serve the best interests of abducted chil-
ren
the child as part of its inquiry into whether the child is 
well settled.41 
I. The Current urisprudence  
child abductions is increasing.44 In 2011, 941 children were reported to 
                                                   
d .35 
 Part I of this Note begins by exploring the text, drafting history, 
and purposes of the well-settled defense.36 Part I then gives an overview 
of the doctrine of equitable tolling, and how American courts have ap-
plied it to the well-settled defense.37 Part II highlights the problems in 
applying equitable tolling to this defense.38 Part III argues that the cur-
rent American approach in applying equitable tolling favors parental 
rights over the child’s rights and best interests.39 It also contends that 
courts applying equitable tolling are being guided in part by the Amer-
ican legal tradition of placing the rights of parents over the rights of 
children.40 Part IV recommends that the U.S. Supreme Court reject 
equitable tolling and instead require courts to take into account the 
concealment of 
 State of American J
on the Convention 
 Bocquet’s ordeal is one of a growing number of stories of interna-
tional child abduction.42 There are many reasons why parents may be 
motivated to abduct their child in contravention of a former partner’s 
custody rights: as a way to protect what they view as the child’s best in-
terests; as revenge on their ex-spouse or partner; as a way to continue 
contact with an ex-spouse or partner; or as a way to avoid domestic vio-
lence.43 Regardless of the motivation, the number of international 
                                                                   
. 
ildren, and the Underlying Objectives of the Hague Convention, 25 Rev. Litig. 
423 006). 
 
34 See infra notes 210--262 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 210--262 and accompanying text
36 See infra notes 42--77 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 78--99 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 100--140 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 141--201 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 173--201 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 202–262 and accompanying text. 
42 See Melissa S. Wills, Note, Interpreting the Hague Convention on International Child Ab-
duction: Why American Courts Need to Reconcile the Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, the Best Inter-
ests of Abducted Ch
, 428 (2
43 Id. 
44 Id. The increase in abductions may be a result of easier travel options, increased so-
cial acceptance of transnational families, and increased divorce rates. Brian S. Kenworthy, 
2013] Equitable Tolling and International Child Abduction 2097 
the Office of Children’s Issues in the U.S. Department of State as being 
abducted from the United States to another country.45 Moreover, the 
same office received 256 requests for the return of children who had 
been abducted from another country into the United States.46 
 Prior to the Convention’s enactment, there was no uniform system 
for recognizing custody determinations made by foreign courts, and 
countries were hesitant or unwilling to enforce foreign custody or-
ders.47 A parent seeking to avoid the enforcement of a custody order 
was thus encouraged to abduct his or her child as a means of forum 
shopping for a more sympathetic court.48 
                                                                                                                      
The Un-Common Law: Emerging Differences Between the United States and the United Kingdom on 
 
the Children’s Rights Aspects of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 12 Ind. 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 329, 330 (2002); Wills, supra note 42, at 428. The number of newly 
reported children abducted from other countries and brought into the United States has 
increased from 290 in 2010, to 344 in 2012. See Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t 
of State, New Incoming Cases—CY 2012 (2012), available at http://travel.state.gov/ 
pdf/CY2012-Incoming_Openstats.pdf; Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
2010 USCA Incoming Case Statistics (2010), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ 
2010IncomingCaseStats4-27-2011.pdf. There has been a decline, however, in the number 
of children reported as abducted from the United States into other countries; the number 
decreased from 1022 in 2010 to 799 in 2012. See Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t 
of State, New Outgoing Cases—CY 2012 (2012), available at http://travel.state.gov/ 
pdf/CY2012-Outgoing_Openstats.pdf; Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
2010 USCA Outgoing Case Statistics (2010), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ 
2010OutgoingCaseStats4-27-2011.pdf. 
45 Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, New Outgoing Cases—CY 
2011 (2011), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/Outgoing_Stats2011.pdf. The De-
partment of State is the Central Authority for the United States. Exec. Order No. 12,648, 
53 Fed. Reg. 30,637 (Aug. 11, 1988). As such, the Department of State has authority over 
incoming and outgoing applications filed under the Convention. Convention, supra note 
11, arts. 8, 9 (granting the power to receive incoming and outgoing applications to the 
“Central Authority” of each member state). 
46 Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, New Incoming Cases—CY 
2011 (2011), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/Incoming_Stats2011.pdf. 
47 Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody—Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 Emory L.J. 291, 
295--97 (1986) (noting that the Convention is a potential international response to chaotic 
jurisdictional laws that encourage child abduction as a means of forum shopping for a 
more sympathetic court). Prior to the enactment of the Convention, American courts had 
several federal and state laws at their disposal to deal with cases of domestic parental kid-
napping. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1738A (2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-330 (2010); 
Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 152.201 (West 2006). In particular, the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, of which a version has been adopted by each state, established standards 
for determining which state has jurisdiction over the custody dispute. Barbara A. Atwood, 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 369, 369 (1991); see, e.g., S.C. 
Code Ann. § 63-15-330; Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 152.201. The Parental Kidnapping Pre-
vention Act of 1980 requires courts to give full faith and credit to the custody determina-
tions of other courts, but it does not apply to international cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738, 1738A. 
48 Esther Levy Blynn, In re: International Child Abduction v. Best Interests of the Child: Com-
ity Should Control, 18 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 353, 356 (1987) (noting that because the 
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 The Convention’s stated objectives respond to this problematic 
behavior by striving to ensure the prompt return of children who were 
wrongfully abducted to another contracting state and to ensure that 
member states respect the custody and access rights under the law of 
other states.49 The Convention thus seeks not only to protect the cus-
tody interests of parents, but also the interests of contracting States in 
having their custody orders respected by other States.50 The Conven-
tion also seeks to protect children from the harm caused by abduction, 
which exemplifies the Convention’s understanding that the best inter-
ests of children are served by deterring wrongful removal from their 
habitual environment.51 
 Congress implemented the Convention through the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”).52 ICARA establishes the 
procedure by which the left-behind parent can assert his or her rights 
under the Convention and seek return of the child.53 Under ICARA, an 
                                                                                                                      
abductor has physical custody of the child, he or she was able to take the child to another 
court and relitigate the custody issue). 
49 Convention, supra note 11, art. 1. 
50 See id. 
51 Id. pmbl.; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 431–32; Eran Sthoeger, International Child Ab-
duction and Children’s Rights: Two Means to the Same End, 32 Mich. J. Int’l L. 511, 525 
(2011). This view enjoys evidentiary support. See Marilyn Freeman, The Effects and Conse-
quences of International Child Abduction, 32 Fam. L.Q. 603, 605, 608, 610–12 (1998) (citing 
several studies that describe the traumatic effect of abduction on children). Abduction can 
upset a child’s sense of security and stability. Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. Children 
who are abducted can experience a sense of loss triggered by the sudden deprivation of 
relationships and their home environment. Freeman, supra, at 605; Wills, supra note 42, at 
429. Children may also experience a sense of guilt for not contacting the left-behind par-
ent. Freeman, supra, at 608. In addition, children may experience isolation stemming from 
a difficulty with the social and linguistic skills required in a new and unfamiliar culture. Id. 
at 604. One study conducted interviews with five children between the ages of six and 
eleven who had been abducted when they were between six and forty-two months old. Id. 
at 607–08. The study found that the amount of trauma a child experiences depends on the 
age of the child when abducted, how the abductor treats the child, how long the abduc-
tion continues, the child’s lifestyle and experiences during the abduction, and the type of 
support and therapy received once returned. Id. at 608. Significantly, the study concluded 
that longer abductions resulted in a more traumatic end to the abduction. Id. at 609. 
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006). 
53 See id. To initiate the process of seeking the return of a child who has been wrong-
fully removed or retained, an application must be filed with a Central Authority. Conven-
tion, supra note 11, art. 8. The application must contain information concerning: the iden-
tity of the applicant; the child and the person who allegedly wrongfully removed the child; 
the date of birth of the child; the grounds on which the applicant’s claim for return of the 
child are based; and the whereabouts of the child. Id. The application may also include a 
copy of decisions or agreements relating to the child’s custody. Convention, supra note 11, 
art. 8. Similarly, an application may also contain a statement of the relevant law from the 
left-behind parent’s state. Id. 
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applicant must first file an application with the Department of State, 
and then initiate judicial proceedings.54 To initiate judicial proceed-
ings, the petitioner must file a petition in the federal or state court that 
has jurisdiction over the child’s location.55 
 The Convention permits a number of defenses that are meant to 
address situations in which the immediate return of the child would not 
be in the child’s best interests.56 Accordingly, if a court finds that the 
respondent has successfully pled any of the defenses, the court may ex-
ercise its discretion to refuse to return a child, but does not have a duty 
to refuse the return.57 The well-settled defense is one such defense that, 
as demonstrated in the Bocquet case, applies when the respondent shows 
that the petition was filed more than a year after the child’s wrongful 
removal or retention.58 
 As evident in Bocquet, courts faced with the well-settled defense 
have grappled with the decision of whether equitable tolling should be 
applied.59 This Part explores the various approaches American courts 
have taken with regard to equitable tolling of the one-year filing rule.60 
                                                                                                                      
54 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b); Incoming Cases—Frequently Asked Questions, Office of Chil-
dren’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/incoming/getting 
started/gettingstarted_4183.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
55 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b). 
56 Convention, supra note 11, arts. 12, 13, 17, 20; see Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. 
There are six defenses to the immediate return of a child. See Convention, supra note 11, 
arts. 12, 13, 17, 20. One such defense is that return would expose the child to a grave risk 
of physical or psychological harm. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); see Convention, supra note 11, art. 
13. Another defense is that return would violate the fundamental protections of human 
rights and freedoms of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, 
art. 20. The court may also refuse return if the child objects to returning and the court 
finds that the child is of an age and maturity at which it is appropriate to consider his or 
her views. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, art. 13. The respondent could 
also show that the petitioner was not exercising his or her custody or access rights at the 
time of removal, or that he or she subsequently acquiesced to the removal. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, art. 13. If the abducting parent has obtained a 
custody decision in the United States, a court hearing a Convention petition can consider 
the reasoning underlying the U.S. custody decision, but cannot refuse return of the child 
solely because of the decision. See Convention, supra note 11, art. 17. 
57 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 460; see Convention, supra note 11, art. 18. There is 
some debate over whether courts can return a child after an affirmative defense has been 
demonstrated. Compare Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16–21 (analyzing the Convention and holding 
that a court does have the authority to return a child after the well-settled defense is suc-
cessfully established), with Weiner, supra note 25, at 479--82 (examining the scholarly de-
bate and arguing that the Convention does not give the court discretion to refuse to re-
turn a child where one of the defenses has been proven). 
58 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1347; see Convention, supra note 11, art. 12. 
59 See Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. 
60 See infra notes 63--99 and accompanying text. 
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Section A introduces the text, drafting history, and purpose of the well-
settled defense, as well as a preliminary examination of equitable toll-
ing.61 Section B explains how American courts have approached the 
application of equitable tolling to the well-settled defense.62 
A. The Well-Settled Defense and Equitable Tolling 
 The drafters of the Convention included the well-settled defense 
to recognize that the swift return of a child following a prolonged ab-
duction, without a judicial review of the merits of the custody claims, 
may not always be in the best interest of the child.63 The drafters also 
included the one-year limit to avoid the difficult task of articulating a 
test that would measure if the child has become integrated in the new 
environment.64 The one-year time period is measured from the date of 
the wrongful removal or retention of the child to the date the left-
behind parent commences proceedings.65 Under ICARA, the proceed-
ings commence when the petition is filed in the court of appropriate 
jurisdiction in the United States.66 
 The language of the Convention makes clear that a court’s obliga-
tion to return a child continues beyond the one-year time limit if it 
cannot be shown that the child is settled in his or her current familial 
and social environment.67 Although the Convention does not list the 
factors that courts should use when evaluating whether a child is well 
settled, the burden of proving that the child is well settled rests with the 
abductor.68 The Department of State has interpreted the Convention to 
require substantial evidence of significant connections that the child 
has made to his or her new location.69 
 This defense generated considerable debate when the member 
states of the Hague Conference first considered it.70 The continuing 
                                                                                                                      
61 See infra notes 63--83 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra notes 84--99 and accompanying text. 
63 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458; see 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (2006); Convention, supra 
note 11, art. 12; supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing the two prongs of the 
well-settled defense). 
64 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458; Weiner, supra note 25, at 436. 
65 Convention, supra note 11, art. 12; see 42 U.S.C. § 11603(f)(3). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 11603(f)(3). 
67 See Convention, supra note 11, art. 12; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459. 
68 Appendix C—Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986); Pérez-Vera, supra note 
13, at 459. 
69 Appendix C—Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,509. 
70 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458–60. 
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obligation of return after the one-year period was added in response to 
the concerns of some states that the one-year limit would form an in-
flexible boundary of the Convention’s applicability.71 The drafters ul-
timately ignored the U.S. concern that the one-year limit would be un-
workable in a large country like the United States, where 
commencement of proceedings requires the difficult task of finding 
the precise jurisdiction in which the child is located.72 
 The member states rejected an earlier approach that would have 
provided for a different time limit for concealed children.73 Specifi-
cally, the preliminary draft of the Hague Convention provided that if 
the child’s whereabouts were known, the time limit was six months 
from the wrongful removal.74 If the child’s whereabouts were con-
cealed, the six-month period would run from when the child was dis-
covered, but proceedings would still have to commence within one year 
of the wrongful removal.75 Ultimately, the Convention incorporated a 
single time limit under the well-settled defense for all abductions.76 In 
doing so, the signatory states rejected the preliminary draft of the Con-
vention that incorporated two separate time limits.77 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the single, one-year limit was included to decrease con-
fusion, the application of equitable estoppel or tolling to the one-year 
limit has produced considerable discord among American courts.78 
Equitable estoppel applies to cases in which the abductor commits bad 
acts, usually secreting the child in an effort to delay the start of pro-
ceedings.79 Alternatively, equitable tolling arises in situations where ex-
 
71 Id. at 459. A preliminary draft that incorporated a discovery rule to delay the start of 
the time period was rejected. Id.; Weiner, supra note 25, at 434. The rejection of this rule 
was thought to improve the Convention because it eliminated the difficulties inherent in 
requiring proof of a parent’s inability to determine the location of the child. Pérez-Vera, 
supra note 13, at 458–60. 
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (2006); Weiner, supra note 25, at 437. The United States al-
so advocated for an eighteen-month time period, but this proposal also was rejected. See 
Weiner, supra note 25, at 437. 
73 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 434. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Convention, supra note 11, art. 12; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459. 
77 Weiner, supra note 25, at 435; see also Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459 (noting that 
the single time limit was a vast improvement over a scheme with multiple time limits be-
cause this approach was clearer). 
78 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459; Weiner, supra note 25, at 416. Compare Font Paulus, 
2012 WL 2524772, at *8 (applying equitable tolling where a left-behind parent could not 
find child despite diligent efforts), with Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at *11--12 (refusing to 
apply equitable tolling where the child was hidden from the left-behind parent). 
79 Weiner, supra note 25, at 414. 
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traordinary events beyond the petitioner’s control—and not the result 
of the respondent’s wrongdoing—cause a delay in the start of the pro-
ceedings.80 Although the origins of the two doctrines differ, in both 
situations the court will delay the start of the one-year clock until the 
date on which the petitioner had the ability to commence proceedings 
in the appropriate jurisdiction.81 
                                                                                                                     
 The Department of State, however, noted in the legal analysis it 
submitted to the Senate before ratification of the Convention that if a 
parent concealed a child’s whereabouts, it was “highly questionable” 
whether the abductor should be able to benefit from the one-year limit 
in the well-settled defense.82 Several appellate and lower courts re-
sponded by applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the well-
settled defense in an effort to ensure that the abducting parent did not 
benefit from his or her own bad acts of concealing the child following 
the wrongful removal.83 
B. American Courts’ Approaches to Equitable Tolling 
 Several district courts have addressed whether equitable tolling 
should apply to the one-year limit of the well-settled doctrine.84 Origi-
 
80 Id. at 415. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that 
equitable tolling could apply to the one-year limit in its 2008 Duarte v. Bardales decision. 
526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008). In Duarte, the petitioner filed her petition with the Mex-
ican Central Authority immediately after the wrongful removal of her children to the 
United States. Id. at 565. The Mexican Central Authority then transmitted the application 
to the United States Central Authority. Id. Her application reached the San Diego, Cali-
fornia District Attorney’s Office in 2003, but no petition was filed until 2005. Id. at 565–66. 
81 Weiner, supra note 25, at 414–16; see, e.g., Font Paulus, 2012 WL 2524772, at *8 (de-
laying the start of the one-year period until after the father was able to locate the child). 
Because their effects are the same and courts refer to both equitable tolling and equitable 
estoppel interchangeably, this Note largely uses the term “equitable tolling” to refer to 
both doctrines. 
82 Appendix C—Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
83 Weiner, supra note 25, at 426; see, e.g., Font Paulus, 2012 WL 2524772, at *8; Mendez 
Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1362; Burdett v. Liguori, No. Civ.A. 303CV1736P, 2003 WL 
23105201, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2003); Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. Some courts 
use the term “equitable tolling” in their opinions, but are actually analyzing the applica-
tion of equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570 (holding that “equitable tolling” 
applies to the one-year period, but only discussing the doctrine in the context in which the 
abducting parent secretes the child from the left-behind parent); Mendez Lynch, 220 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1363 (reasoning that if “equitable tolling” does not apply, abducting parents 
will be rewarded for concealing their children). 
84 Nunez, 2008 WL 898658, at *6 (acknowledging that a majority of courts agree that 
equitable tolling should apply); Weiner, supra note 25, at 409–10 (discussing the develop-
ment of case law on the issue of equitable estoppel). 
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nally, courts were hesitant to apply the doctrine.85 Since 2000, however, 
most courts that have considered the issue have applied equitable toll-
ing.86 
 In 2004, in Furnes v. Reeves, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit became the first appellate court to apply equitable tolling 
to the Convention’s well-settled defense.87 In 2008, in Duarte v. Bardales, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit joined the Eleventh 
Circuit and held that equitable tolling applied to the one-year period 
established in the well-settled defense.88 The Eleventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits both noted that the failure to apply equitable tolling would sig-
nificantly undermine the Convention’s goal of deterring abductions by 
rewarding parents who abduct and conceal children for more than a 
year.89 Both courts also likened the one-year period to a statute of limi-
tations and noted the precedent that equitable tolling should custom-
arily be read into statutes of limitations.90 
                                                                                                                      
 
85 Weiner, supra note 25, at 409; see, e.g., In re Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 & n.10 
(D. Colo. 1997) (acknowledging the possibility of applying equitable tolling but ultimately 
refusing to); Wojcik v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 420--21 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (refusing to 
consider the application of equitable tolling principles to the case). 
86 Nunez, 2008 WL 898658, at *6; see, e.g., Font Paulus, 2012 WL 2524772, at *8; Mendez 
Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1362; Burdett, 2003 WL 23105201, at *4; Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1348. 
87 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 2004). The Furnes court uses the term “equitable toll-
ing,” but its analysis was based on equitable estoppel. See id. (affirming the district court’s 
application of “equitable tolling . . . where the parent removing the child has secreted the 
child from the parent seeking return”). 
88 Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570. Despite using the term “equitable tolling,” the Duarte court’s 
analysis revealed that it relied on equitable estoppel principles. See id. (noting that equita-
ble tolling should apply when there is evidence that the abducting parent concealed the 
child, and agreeing with other courts that reasoned that refusing to toll the start of the 
one-year time limit would reward the abducting parent for hiding the child). Although it 
did not fully address the issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that 
the use of tolling for the well-settled defense was not clearly erroneous in its 2009 decision 
in Dietz v. Dietz. 349 F. App’x 930, 933 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2009). The Dietz court did not fully 
address the issue because the appellant did not raise it on appeal. Id. Despite using the 
term “equitable tolling,” the Diez court analyzed the issue of equitable estoppel. Id. at 933 
n.1 (citing Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723--24) (noting that petitioner was unsuccessful in establish-
ing contact with her children because respondent’s family was unwilling to tell her their 
location). 
89 Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570; Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723. In Duarte, the court first noted that 
petitioner’s claim could fail simply because of the passage of one year. Id. at 569. The court 
reasoned that the prejudicial effects of having an otherwise unavailable affirmative defense 
available to the abducing parent was largely why other courts had applied equitable tolling 
to the well-settled defense despite the absence of any indication in either the Convention 
or ICARA that such principles were to be used. Id. at 569--70. 
90 Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570 (citing Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002)); 
Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723 (citing Young, 535 U.S. at 49–50). There is even precedent within 
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 In October 2012, in Lozano v. Alvarez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit became the first appellate court to reject equitable 
tolling of the one-year limit for the well-settled defense.91 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit followed suit in September 2013 
in Yaman v. Yaman.92 Both courts noted that nothing in the text of the 
Convention or its drafting history referred to the date of discovery or a 
delay in cases of concealment, which suggested to them that a reasoned 
decision was made that concealment should not toll the start of the 
one-year period.93 The First and Second Circuits also reasoned that 
courts do not need to employ equitable relief for the well-settled de-
fense, because courts may exercise their discretion to not return a child 
even after the one-year period.94 Noting that great weight is given to 
the executive branch’s interpretation of treaties, the First and Second 
Circuits agreed with the State Department’s position that the applica-
tion of equitable relief was improper.95 The Yaman court adopted the 
                                                                                                                      
the Eleventh Circuit that holds that absent a congressional statement stating that tolling 
should not apply, courts should apply equitable tolling to all federal statutes of limitations. 
Ellis v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706–08 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
“equitable tolling applies to all federal statutes unless the statute states otherwise”). 
91 See 697 F.3d at 51. 
92 See 730 F.3d at 16. 
93 See id. at 12–14; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51--54. 
94 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 13; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52. 
95 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 14–15 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3696 ( June 24, 2013) (No. 12-820), 2013 WL 2280948, at *8); Lozano, 697 F.3d at 
54. Both courts noted that the weight to be given to an agency’s interpretation depended 
on its consistency, or lack thereof, with earlier interpretations. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 14; 
Lozano, 697 F.3d at 54 n.14. The executive branch had given two previous statements on 
the application of equitable tolling to the well-settled defense: one in 1986 in its legal anal-
ysis of the Convention, and another in a 2006 questionnaire that examined the practical 
application of the Convention. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 14–15; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 54 n.14; 
Appendix C—Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986); Hague Conference on 
Private Int’l Law, Collated Responses to the Questionnaire Concerning the 
Practical Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction 577 (2006), available at http://www.hcch. 
net/upload/wop/abd_pd02efs2006.pdf. The courts noted that both earlier executive 
branch statements had simply suggested that courts may consider the conduct of the ab-
ducting parent when exercising their equitable discretion after the one-year period had 
passed. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 14–15; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 54 n.14. The Lozano court rea-
soned that these prior statements were consistent with the government’s current position 
that equitable tolling should not apply to the Article 12 defense, but concluded that courts 
should consider whether the child was concealed as part of the well-settled inquiry. See 697 
F.3d at 54 n.14. The First Circuit refused to give much weight to the 2006 questionnaire 
response because it contained no analysis of the treaty, and only stated a general policy 
preference against incentivizing concealment. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 15. 
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Lozano court’s holding that the Convention’s overarching goal of deter-
ring child abduction was based on the assumption that the return of 
the child would be in the child’s best interest.96 Both courts also recog-
nized that the Convention’s signatories had anticipated some situa-
tions, as embodied in the exceptions to the requirement of prompt re-
turn, in which the child’s countervailing interests would overcome this 
assumption.97 Accordingly, the Lozano court concluded that allowing 
equitable tolling would frustrate the well-settled exception and run 
counter to the true goal of the Convention: protecting the child’s best 
interests.98 The Yaman court took a somewhat softer approach, and 
simply held that the intentions of the Convention’s drafters were un-
clear.99 
II. The P Tolling 
at equitable tolling should 
ot b
ble tolling in the text and drafting history of the Convention and 
      
roblems Inherent in Applying Equitable 
Principles to the Well-Settled Defense 
 The courts that apply equitable tolling to the well-settled defense 
treat it like a statute of limitations and assert that tolling furthers the 
Convention’s goal of deterring the abduction and concealment of chil-
dren.100 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits 
have criticized such a reading of the well-settled defense.101 These 
courts rely on the text, drafting history, and underlying purposes of the 
Convention to support their contention th
n e read into the well-settled defense.102 
 This Part considers the arguments made by critics of equitable toll-
ing by analyzing the text, drafting history, and purposes behind the 
Convention.103 Section A first discusses the lack of support for equita-
                                                                                                                
ntion, supra note 11, arts. 12, 13, 17, 20; Yaman, 730 F.3d at 15–16; Lozano, 
697 
d 
on w ncealed—but ultimately rejected this arrangement. Id. 
es, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008); Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 
702
rts’ reasoning for rejecting 
the 
c-
com nd purposes of the Convention). 
96 Yaman, 730 F.3d at 15–16 (citing Lozano, 697 F.3d at 54); see Lozano, 697 F.3d at 53--54. 
97 See Conve
F.3d at 53. 
98 Lozano, 697 F.3d at 53–54. The Lozano court specifically emphasized that the signa-
tory states had considered an approach that would have included two time periods—base
hether the child had been co
99 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16. 
100 See Duarte v. Bardal
, 723 (11th Cir. 2004). 
101 See Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 12–16 (1st Cir. 2013); Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 
41, 50--55 (2d. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3696 ( June 24, 2013) (No. 12-820); 
supra notes 91--99 and accompanying text (summarizing the cou
application of equitable tolling to the well-settled defense). 
102 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12–16; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 50--55; infra notes 106--140 and a
panying text (discussing the text, drafting history, a
103 See infra notes 106--140 and accompanying text. 
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ICARA.104 Section B then explains why the goals of the Convention are 
not served by equitable tolling.105 
                                                                                                                     
A. Text and Drafting History 
 Although the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits alluded to the purpose of the Convention when applying equi-
table tolling to the well-settled defense, there is nothing in the lan-
guage of the Convention, its drafting history, or ICARA to support its 
application to situations where the abductor hid the child or adminis-
trative error caused a delay.106 
 The language of Article 12’s well-settled defense includes a one-
year time period that is measured from the date of the wrongful re-
moval or retention of the child to the date the left-behind parent 
commences proceedings.107 ICARA explicitly adopted the terms of Ar-
ticle 12, and parents commence proceedings when they file a petition 
in the court with jurisdiction over the child’s location.108 Despite con-
ceding the lack of textual support for their position, the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits held that equitable tolling should be read into the 
Convention in order to avoid significantly undermining the treaty’s 
goal of deterring child abduction.109 Conversely, the First and Second 
Circuits, have concluded that the language of Article 12 evinces the 
drafters’ intent to have a clear trigger date without the possibility of 
tolling.110 The First and Second Circuits reasoned that the drafters 
could have easily changed the start of the one-year period to the date 
 
n’s 
ove e). 
 the child is located at the time the petition is 
filed
.8. 
104 See infra notes 106--120 and accompanying text. 
105 See infra notes 121--140 and accompanying text. 
106 Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12–14; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 50--55; see Weiner, supra note 25, at 
434 (noting the lack of textual support for equitable tolling in Article 12); infra notes 107–
120 and accompanying text. But see Duarte, 526 F. 3d at 570 (holding that equitable tolling 
should apply to the well-settled defense so that it does not undermine the Conventio
rarching purpose of deterring child abduction); Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723 (sam
107 Convention, supra note 11, art. 12; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458–59. 
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e) (2006) (stating that a respondent opposing the return of 
the child must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) more than a year has 
passed since the wrongful removal and (2) the child is settled in his or her new environ-
ment); id. § 11603(b), (f)(3) (defining “commencement of proceedings” as the filing of a 
petition in “any court which has the jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to 
exercise its jurisdiction in the place where
”); Convention, supra note 11, art. 12. 
109 See Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570; Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723. 
110 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12–13; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51 n
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th the left-behind parent discovered the child’s whereabouts, but that 
they decided against it.
at 
his draft-
g h
history in their decisions to exercise equitable discretion and apply toll-
ing.
111 
 In fact, the signatory states rejected the preliminary draft of the 
Convention, which contained a different time limit for children who 
had been concealed.112 A preliminary draft provided that if the child’s 
whereabouts were known, the time period was six-months from the date 
of the wrongful removal.113 If the child’s whereabouts were concealed, 
however, the six-month period would not begin until the child was dis-
covered, allowing for a maximum of one year between the wrongful re-
moval and the commencement of proceedings.114 The Ninth and Elev-
enth Circuits, however, did not address the drafting history in their 
analysis.115 Conversely, the First and Second Circuits held that t
in istory demonstrated a conscious choice on the part of the drafters 
to reject a different time limit when children are concealed.116 
 When interpreting a treaty, courts begin with the text of the trea-
ty.117 An important piece of textual interpretation involves analyzing 
the drafters’ intent.118 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits spent very little 
time analyzing the Convention’s text, and wholly ignored the drafting 
119 The First and Second Circuits, on the other hand, followed the 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 13; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51 n.8. 
112 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459 (noting that the single time limit was a vast im-
provement over the scheme in a preliminary draft of the Convention); Weiner, supra note 
25, ccompanying text (discussing the rejection of a pre-
limi aft that would have included two time limits: one for children who were not 
con
. 
oth the rejection of the preliminary draft with an extended 
time
ge of international conventions and treaties. Id. at 9–10. The 
Cou
ould thus ensure uniformity 
amo
 
at 434; see supra notes 73--75 and a
nary dr
cealed and one for children who were concealed). 
113 Weiner, supra note 25, at 434. 
114 Id
115 See generally Duarte, 526 F.3d 563 (applying equitable tolling principles to the well-
settled defense without analyzing the treaty’s drafting history); Furnes, 362 F.3d 702 
(same). 
116 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 13–14; Lozano, 607 F.3d at 52–53; see also Weiner, supra note 
25, at 434 (contending that b
 limit for concealed children and the common occurrence of abducting parents con-
cealing their children suggest that the drafters were aware of concealment concerns but 
consciously rejected tolling). 
117 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010). The Supreme Court has noted the impor-
tance of following the langua
rt reasoned that a close reading of such agreements would keep the document’s stan-
dards and definitions unencumbered by local practices and w
ng signatories. Id. at 12. 
118 See id. at 18–20 (supporting the court’s textual analysis of a “right of custody” under 
Article 3 of the Convention by analyzing the drafters’ intent). 
119 See Duarte, 526 F.3d at 569–70; Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723. In its 2008 decision in Duarte 
v. Bardales, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit only briefly analyzed the text of 
the Convention, and instead focused its analysis on why equitable tolling should be read 
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Supreme Court’s recommendations for treaty analysis by conducting an 
in-depth analysis of the text and drafting history.120 
B. Purposes of the Convention 
 A proper analysis of the Convention’s defenses begins with the un-
derstanding that the goal of deterring child abduction is not para-
mount.121 The goal of deterring the abduction and concealment of 
children is important, but it is not the sole objective of the Conven-
tion.122 The Convention’s preamble explicitly provides that “the inter-
ests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to 
their custody.”123 Deterrence of abduction is given a large role in the 
Convention but only because deterrence usually serves the interests of 
children.124 The swift return of abducted children based on the almost 
automatic recognition of a foreign custody order eliminates the benefit 
of abduction by ensuring that abducting parents cannot forum shop 
and relitigate custody disputes.125 The defenses were included, how-
ever, to recognize that that the swift return of a child is not always in the 
best interests of the child.126 
 U.S. law aims to deter child abductions, but does so without relying 
on equitable tolling principles.127 Parental child abduction is a crime in 
all states, and a parent who removes a child from the United States in 
                                                                                                                      
into the defense. See 526 F.3d at 568--69 (citing the text of the Convention, but immedi-
ately transitioning its discussion to highlight the potentially prejudicial effects on a parent 
who fails to file within the one-year period). Similarly, in its 2004 decision in Furnes v. 
Reeves, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit briefly summarized the Conven-
tion’s Article 12, but quickly changed course to cite precedent that supported the applica-
tion of equitable tolling to statutes of limitations without any further textual analysis of the 
Convention. See 362 F.3d at 723. 
120 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12–14; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51--53 & n.8. 
121 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 477 (arguing that courts should accept that Article 12’s 
purpose is not to deter child abductions, but rather to recognize that settled children have 
an interest in a court revisiting the merits of their custody determinations). 
122 Convention, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 1; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432; Weiner, 
supra note 25, at 475. 
123 Convention, supra note 11, pmbl. 
124 See id.; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 431–32 (noting that the true victim of kidnap-
ping is the child who suffers from an upset in stability, loss of contact with the left-behind 
parent, and frustration with adapting to a new language and culture). 
125 Blynn, supra note 48, at 356; see Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 429–30. 
126 Lozano, 697 F.3d at 53; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. The Convention does not in-
clude a specific examination of the best interests of the child because it is a vague standard, 
and because in the past courts often took advantage of the vagueness to substitute their own 
discretion for that of the foreign custody orders. Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 431. 
127 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 454–56 (describing American laws that address child 
abduction and concealment). 
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contravention of another parent’s custody rights runs afoul of federal 
criminal law.128 Concealing a child during abduction is a more serious 
crime in some states, and other states make it a relevant factor during 
nt
hould be given to a child’s preference to remain with 
e a
barred 
strength of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ analogy.136 The Supreme 
se encing.129 
 Courts can also ensure deterrence of child abduction by taking 
concealment of the child into account in denying abducting parents 
the benefits of the Convention’s defenses.130 This could potentially 
eliminate the benefit of concealment by foreclosing otherwise available 
defenses.131 For example, courts have held that concealment decreases 
the weight that s
th bductor.132 
 Courts applying the doctrine of equitable tolling also reason that 
the one-year period is similar to a statute of limitations, which is tradi-
tionally tolled.133 Statutes of limitations provide that a plaintiff’s ability 
to file suit expires after a designated passage of time.134 As noted by the 
First and Second Circuits, the one-year period in the well-settled de-
fense is unlike statutes of limitations, because a court is not 
from ordering the return of a child after one year has passed.135 
 Even if the one-year period functioned like a statute of limitations, 
the lack of any Congressional intent to treat it as such undercuts the 
                                                                                                                      
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006) (making it a federal crime to remove a child from the 
Uni
nceal-
men
the level of the felony). 
a note 25, at 456–57 (noting that concealment is already taken into 
acco
anying text (discussing how courts weigh concealment against a finding that the 
chil at stands as a defense to re-
turn
rnes, 362 F.3d at 723. 
ute of Limitations: Limitations by 
Defa
 or the 
 
ted States in violation of parental rights, punishable by a fine and up to three years in 
prison); Weiner, supra note 25, at 454--55. 
129 Weiner, supra note 25, at 454; see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 278.6(3) (West 2008) 
(stating that a child’s concealment is an aggravating factor to be considered in a kidnap-
ping sentencing); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 565.150, 565.153 (West 2010) (stating that co
t elevates the crime of interference with custodial rights from a “class A” misdemeanor 
to a “class D” felony, and the length of concealment elevates 
130 See Weiner, supr
unt to deny the affirmative defenses under Article 12). 
131 See id. at 457. 
132 See, e.g., id. at 456 (citing Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 2007 
WL 2344760, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2007) (noting that a mother’s attempt to isolate 
her child during his early childhood in the United States diminished the credibility of the 
child’s stated preference to remain in the United States)); see also infra notes 227--239 and 
accomp
d is of sufficient age and maturity to make an objection th
). 
133 See, e.g., Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570; Fu
134 Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback” Stat
ult, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 454, 457 (1993). 
135 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 13; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52. 
136 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 428–29 (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s application 
of equitable tolling to Article 12 was not supported by a detailed analysis of ICARA
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Court has adopted a rebuttable presumption of applying equitable toll-
ing when federal statutes are silent.137 But, the presumption of applying 
tolling is rebuttable by a showing that tolling would be incompatible 
with the legislative scheme.138 As the First and Second Circuits noted, 
the drafting history of the Convention demonstrates an intent to focus 
on the needs of the child in including the one-year time period—not 
seeking to deter child abductions.139 Thus, these courts reasoned that 
equitable tolling would be inconsistent with the Convention’s 
scheme.140 
 
III. Equitab Problems  
 child ab-
uct
                                                                                                                     
le Tolling: Ignoring Obvious 
to Protect Parental Rights 
 American courts applying equitable tolling to the well-settled de-
fense insist that the overarching goal of the Convention is to deter child 
abductions.141 Deterring child abductions can serve multiple pur-
poses.142 The Convention presumes that deterring child abductions 
protects the best interests of the child in that it seeks to place the child 
in a stabile environment.143 Deterring child abduction also serves to 
protect the custodial rights of the child’s parent.144 American law views 
the right to the custody and care of one’s child as a fundamental liberty 
interest that is protected by the Constitution, and deterring
d ion thus fits neatly into this constitutional framework.145 
 The Convention, however, also includes defenses that recognize 
that the deterrence of child abduction through the swift return of the 
 
Convention); see also United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48 (1998) (holding that equi-
tabl nt with the statute). 
v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49--50 (2002). 
lication of equitable tolling); Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723 (11th Cir. 
200
 
(cit n children). 
Supreme Court 
pre
e tolling is impermissible when its application is inconsiste
137 See Young 
138 Id. at 51. 
139 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 13–16; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52–53. 
140 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 13–16; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51--54. 
141 See Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Conven-
tion’s overarching goal is to deter child abduction, and that deterring child abduction 
requires the app
4) (same). 
142 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 429--30. 
143 See Convention, supra note 11, pmbl.; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 431; supra note 51
ing arguments made by scholars on the traumatic effect that abduction has o
144 See Convention, supra note 11, art. 1; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 430. 
145 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that the interest of parents in 
rearing their children is one of the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by the 
American courts); see also infra note 152 and accompanying text (outlining 
cedent that supports the fundamental right to care for one’s children). 
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child does not always serve the child’s interests.146 The hesitancy of 
courts to undercut deterrence is apparent in their willingness to apply a 
doctrine to the well-settled defense that lacks support in the Conven-
tion’s text, drafting history, and purposes.147 This hesitancy demon-
rat
urt 
decisions are in accordance with American jurisprudence on parental 
rights, w 151 
                                                                                                                     
st es the preference of American courts for preserving parental 
rights.148 
 This Part argues that the courts that apply equitable tolling are rely-
ing on the American legal tradition of prioritizing parental rights over 
children’s rights and interests.149 Section A demonstrates how courts 
that apply equitable tolling focus on parental rights to the detriment of 
the children’s rights and interests.150 Section B argues that these co
hich often minimizes the rights and interests of children.
A. The Role of Parental Rights in Equitable Tolling Decisions 
 The courts’ strong preference for preserving the rights of parents 
is well-established in American law.152 This preference can be seen in 
 
ompanying text (discussing the text, drafting his-
tory
ts often report physical symptoms, such as impaired sleep and loss of appetite. Id. at 
616. 
 their children absent a finding that they are unfit parents. See 
Trox
146 See Convention, supra note 11, arts. 12, 13, 17, 20; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. 
147 See supra notes 100--140 and acc
, and purposes of the Convention). 
148 See, e.g., Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723 (noting that equitable tolling is necessary to deter 
child abduction). Although this Note argues that children’s rights should be valued more 
than parental rights in these circumstances, this Note still recognizes that the abduction of 
one’s child is a traumatic event that has great effects on a parent. For example, many par-
ents of abducted children in one study felt that the abduction was motivated by a desire to 
hurt them, with a much smaller percentage citing motivations of anger over the couple’s 
separation, and a desire to be with the child. Geoffrey L. Greif & Rebecca L. Hegar, Parents 
Who Abduct: A Qualitative Study with Implications for Practice, Family Relations, July 1994, at 
283, 284. As a result, these left-behind parents often describe a great feeling of loss, as well 
as feelings of rage, loneliness, fear, and severe depression. See Freeman, supra note 51, 615–
16 (noting that the pain is often described as “beyond endurance”). In addition, these 
paren
149 See infra notes 152--201 and accompanying text. 
150 See infra notes 152--172 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra notes 173--201 and accompanying text. 
152 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534--35 (1925) 
(holding that parents have a liberty interest in directing the upbringing and education of 
their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that parents have a 
right to the liberty to establish a home and raise their children). The Supreme Court first 
recognized this parental right in Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923, when it acknowledged that the 
right to “establish a home and bring up children” was part of the liberty guaranteed by the 
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. See 262 U.S. at 399 (citing U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV). Parents thus have a fundamental constitutional right to make decisions about how 
best to care for and raise
el, 530 U.S. at 68--70. 
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the way that the courts applying equitable tolling consider the facts of 
the cases before them.153 Even if the child’s interests are mentioned 
abducting par-
nt 
to the community, family, or 
The court reasoned that equitable tolling must apply to the one-year 
                                                                                                                     
abstractly, such interests are quickly disregarded as courts focus on the 
rights, actions, and interests of the parents.154 
 For example, in 2004, in Duarte v. Bardales, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit discussed the parents’ actions and interests 
in great detail without delving into the children’s rights and inter-
ests.155 The court mentioned the concern of uprooting the children, 
but quickly deemed that concern was outweighed by the need to deter 
abductions.156 The Duarte court concluded that awarding the abducting 
parent with an affirmative defense would encourage the abductions 
and concealment of children.157 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
implicitly reasoned that it would be worse to award the 
e access to an affirmative defense than it would be to remove the 
children from their home of almost a year and a half.158 
 When the Ninth Circuit discussed whether to apply equitable toll-
ing, it emphasized the prejudicial effects that the failure to file within 
one year would have on the left-behind parent.159 The court notably 
did not mention the children’s ties 
friends.160 In fact, the court never analyzed the children’s interests in 
remaining settled in the same home.161 
 Similarly, in its 2002 decision in Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida relied on parent-
focused reasoning to support the application of equitable tolling.162 
 
153 See infra notes 155--172 and accompanying text. 
154 See, e.g., Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570; Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 
1347, 1363 (M.D. Fla. 2002). 
155 See Duarte, 526 F.3d at 565 (describing that “Baradales removed [the children] from 
Mexico” and that “[i]t is undisputed that Bardales took the two youngest children without 
Duarte’s knowledge or permission”). 
156 See id. at 570. 
157 Id. 
158 See id. The father wrongfully removed the children from their mother’s custody in 
Mexico during a visit in July 2003. Id. at 565. The mother promptly filed a Hague Petition 
with the Mexican Central Authority, but due to unknown problems it was not filed in the 
proper California court until April 2005. Id. at 565--66. 
159 Id. at 569. 
160 Id. at 569–70. 
161 See Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570. The court noted that it “recognize[d] the serious con-
cerns with uprooting a child who is well settled regardless of whether the abducting parent 
hid the child” but stated that “significant consideration” had to be given to the deterrence 
of child abduction. Id. 
162 See 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. 
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period to avoid rewarding a parent for abducting and concealing their 
children for more than a year.163 The court, however, did not mention, 
any concern for the effects of uprooting the children, or how applying 
ui
in the 
court’s reasoning to support its application of equitable tolling.172 
                                                                                                                     
eq table tolling would impact the children’s interests.164 
 When discussing the facts in Mendez Lynch, the court highlighted 
the parents’ actions, but failed to note the interests of the children.165 
The court first detailed the wrongdoing of the abducting mother.166 
The court noted that she had taken the children while their father was 
on vacation without leaving any indication as to what happened to her 
or the children.167 The court then noted the tireless efforts of the left-
behind father in his numerous attempts to find his children.168 The 
court concluded that the father’s efforts over the course of eleven 
months were unsuccessful as a result of the mother’s substantial under-
taking to conceal herself and the children.169 Finally, the court noted 
that the father had spent time attempting to resolve the issue without 
resorting to court proceedings.170 Despite analyzing how the actions and 
interests of the parents impacted the application of equitable tolling, 
the Mendez Lynch court did not discuss what consideration should be 
given to the interests and rights of the children.171 Far from being ana-
lyzed, the children’s rights and interests were not even mentioned 
 
163 Id. As an initial matter, the court determined that the one-year period was similar to 
a statute of limitations. Id. at 1362--63. 
164 See generally id. (applying equitable tolling without considering or mentioning any 
concern of the effects of uprooting the children). 
165 See id. at 1363. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. The mother abandoned the house, sold, shipped, or donated all of its contents, 
and left before the father returned from his vacation. Id. at 1352. 
168 Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. The father returned to his home in Argen-
tina to find an empty house and immediately called friends and acquaintances to deter-
mine what had happened to his wife and children. Id. at 1352. Because no one knew where 
she had taken the children, the father went to the local police department to file a missing 
persons and robbery report. Id. The father also called airlines and immigration officials, 
and revoked his authorization for the children to be able to leave the country. Id. He then 
contacted Interpol and was able to determine that his wife had gone to the United States. 
Id. A month later, the father learned that his children and their mother were living in Mi-
ami, Florida, with a family with the last name Vazquez, so he called every phone number 
listed there under Vazquez. Id. at 1353. 
169 Id. at 1352–53, 1363. 
170 Id. at 1363. 
171 See id. The court discussed the children’s interests in determining that they were 
not well settled. Id. The court conducted this analysis in the event that the court’s equita-
ble tolling decision was overturned on appeal. See id. 
172 See id. at 1362–63. 
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B. Subordination of Children’s Rights and Interests in American Courts 
 The lack of consideration of the child’s best interests in the equi-
table tolling cases reflects the overall subordination of children’s rights 
to parental rights in American law.173 In contrast to parents, whose 
rights are largely regarded as fundamental, children were traditionally 
seen as objects, without rights, to be used as resources for their par-
ents.174 The recognition of children’s rights and interests has grown 
substantially, but remains much more amorphous than parental rights, 
and is most often left to varying state statutes and court decisions.175 
Where children’s constitutional rights are recognized, they are limited, 
both by the parental right to control their children and the state’s pow-
er to police children’s behavior.176 
 U.S. custody law, as with most family law issues, is determined by 
the individual states, and—in response to the perceived problem of un-
fettered judicial discretion—states began to enact legislation aimed at 
limiting a judge’s discretion in custody determinations.177 The laws that 
resulted from this movement vary from state to state in the weight they 
give to the welfare of the child.178 These laws range from those that 
make the welfare of the child the sole consideration in custody dis-
putes, to those that do not mention the welfare of the child at all as a 
                                                                                                                      
173 Compare New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340--41 (1985) (noting that a minor’s 
right to privacy was limited by the adult administrators’ need to keep order), with Duarte, 
526 F.3d at 570 (determining that concerns about deterring abductions that interfered 
with custodial rights of a parent outweighed concerns about the risk of uprooting the chil-
dren). 
174 Ruth Zafran, Children’s Rights as Relational Rights: The Case of Relocation, 18 Am. U. J. 
Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 163, 179--80 (2010). A state’s power to police children’s behavior is 
broader than its power to police adult behavior. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 
(1943) (recognizing that a state may exercise its police power over children to a greater ex-
tant than it can over adults); Zafran, supra, at 183. 
175 See infra notes 183--201 and accompanying text (discussing children’s rights and in-
terests as recognized by American law). 
176 See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409, 413 (1981) (holding that a statute that re-
quired parental notification of a minor’s decision to have an abortion was constitutional); 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638--39 (1979) (noting that legal restrictions on a minor’s 
liberty are important because they enhance the child’s chances for growth and maturity); 
Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (holding that the state has broader power to control children’s ac-
tions than to control adult’s actions). 
177 See Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody Cas-
es, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 495, 506 (2001) (discussing the legislative movement that 
resulted in several legislatures enumerating specific factors to be considered in child cus-
tody determinations); see also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (noting that family 
law is traditionally left to the states). 
178 James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About 
Their Relationships, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 845, 907–10 (2003). 
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consideration.179 Moreover, different states use different factors and 
presumptions to determine what constitutes the best interests of the 
child.180 
 Coupled with inconsistencies of opinion within each state, the 
wide variations among state statutes supports the criticism that the best 
interests of the child standard is too malleable and imprecise to provide 
any meaningful protection of children’s rights.181 Some commentators 
have proposed that the confusion surrounding the best interests stan-
dard allows courts and legislatures to create presumptions that favor 
the more well-defined rights of parents even as they claim to consider 
the welfare of the child.182 
                                                                                                                      
 
179 See Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 Minn L. Rev. 1187, 1205 (2012) (noting 
that the welfare of the child is the sole consideration in thirty-five states); Dwyer, supra note 
178, at 907 (noting that some states’ laws governing custody disputes do not mention the 
interests of the child); see, e.g., Ala. Code § 30-3-1 (2011) (not mentioning best interests of 
the child); Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(c), (d) (2012) (listing only the welfare of the child); 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-403 (Supp. 2012) (same); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-914(a)(3) 
(2001) (listing the welfare of the child as a primary factor); Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 
208, § 31 (West 1998) (listing only the welfare of the child); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.137 
(2011) (listing the welfare of the child as a primary factor); Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002 
(West 2003) (same). 
180 See Dwyer, supra note 178, at 916–19. States may consider the preferences of the 
child, the primary parental caretaker prior to a divorce, parenting skills, stability of the 
home environment, fairness between the parents, welfare of the community, or behavior 
of the parent the court deems immoral. 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 1000 (2013); Dwyer, supra note 
178, at 916–26; see, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 461-A:6 (2012) (listing eleven factors to be 
considered in determining the child’s best interests). Some states also specifically exclude 
considerations of factors such as racial prejudice, religious practices of the parents, career 
commitments, or plans to relocate. Dwyer, supra note 178, at 926–29; see, e.g., Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 452.375(8) (2012) (prohibiting the consideration of the parents’ age, sex, or fi-
nancial status). States also employ varying presumptions in favor of joint custody, parental 
visitation if sole custody is awarded, custody to the primary caretaker, and allocation of 
custody based on the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking duties 
prior to the custody dispute. Dwyer, supra note 178, at 907, 911, 917–19, 932–33. 
181 See Mary Becker, Judicial Discretion in Child Custody: The Wisdom of Solomon?, 81 Ill. 
B.J. 650, 651 (1993) (noting that the best interests standard’s lack of guidance under-
standably leads judges to insert their own biases when making custody determinations); 
Stephen Meili, U.K. Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of Domestic Court Acceptance of 
International Human Rights Law, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1123, 1140–41 (noting that the Convention 
requires primary consideration to be given to the best interests of the child, and describ-
ing the struggle in the United Kingdom to determine the meaning of the phrase); Re-
becca M. Stahl, “Don’t Forget About Me”: Implementing Article 12 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, 24 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 803, 820 (2007) (noting that, 
when analyzing what is in a child’s best interests, the judge has discretion over what factors 
to consider); Zafran, supra note 174, at 178 (noting that the best interests standard has 
been criticized for being subjective, vague, and malleable). 
182 See Stahl, supra note 181, at 821 (quoting Hillary Rodham as saying in 1973 that the 
best interests test is a rationalization that allows judges to make determinations about a 
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 Children’s rights are not as neatly defined as parental rights, and 
oftentimes receive less attention than parental rights.183 These rights are 
largely left to a combination of case law and state legislation that do not 
present a clear and uniform stance on children’s rights in America.184 
 The Supreme Court has noted that the Constitution protects mi-
nors to an extent that is limited by the need to control, discipline, and 
parent them.185 For example, in 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Supreme Court held that students had the 
right to freely express themselves, but noted that this right might not 
extend to cases in which school administrators reasonably forecast that 
a student’s expression would interfere with learning or student disci-
pline.186 In 1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court similarly 
recognized a student’s privacy interest in not being unreasonably 
searched, but noted that the reasonableness standard was diminished 
in a school context where administrators had a substantial need to 
maintain order in schools.187 In 1981, in H.L. v. Matheson, the Supreme 
Court affirmed a minor’s right to an abortion, but qualified this right 
by upholding the constitutionality of a state law that required parental 
notice.188 
 The Supreme Court has also restricted the judiciary’s role in pro-
tecting children’s rights and best interests by acknowledging a rebut-
table presumption that nonabusive parents act in their children’s best 
                                                                                                                      
child’s future); Zafran, supra note 174 at 178 (noting that the best interests standard has 
been criticized for being subjective, vague, and malleable). 
183 See Stahl, supra note 181, at 820; Zafran, supra note 174, at 182–83. 
184 Zafran, supra note 174, at 182--83. 
185 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (recognizing that children have a 
liberty interest in not being confined); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that students are persons who have fundamental rights, but 
that their rights are limited); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 30 (1967) (noting that “neither 
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,” but that proceed-
ings involving juveniles do not need to conform with every aspect of adult criminal trials). 
186 393 U.S. at 511, 514. 
187 469 U.S. at 340--41. 
188 450 U.S. at 409, 413. The Matheson Court emphasized that the state has an impor-
tant interest in protecting adolescents, especially when there are significant medical, emo-
tional, and psychological consequences involved in the procedure. Id. at 411. Moreover, 
the Court distinguished abortions from other medical procedures undergone later in 
pregnancy by noting that these other medical decisions were unlikely to involve potentially 
grave emotional consequences. Id. at 412–13. Despite its willingness to burden the rights of 
a minor to receive an abortion in Matheson, the Court had previously expressed an unwill-
ingness to burden the same rights of an adult woman. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 
194--95 (1973) (holding that a state statute that required a woman seeking a first-trimester 
abortion to have it performed in a specially-accredited hospital was unconstitutional). 
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interests.189 This recognition is based on the law’s presumption that 
parents act with greater maturity and experience than their children, 
and that the natural bonds of affection between parent and child would 
typically lead a parent to act in their child’s best interests.190 
 Some state legislation indirectly grants rights to children.191 For 
example, certain legislation prohibits some types of parental conduct 
toward children, such as physical abuse and neglect.192 These rights are 
also sometimes indirectly granted through the obligations that corre-
spond with parental rights, such as the obligation to meet the health, 
education, and welfare needs of their child.193 Although the rights pro-
tected vary among states, they often include the right of children to be 
with their natural born parents, the right to good physical care, the 
right to education, and the right to be protected from physical harm.194 
 The eminence of parental rights also limits the ability of states to 
protect the constitutional and statutory rights that children enjoy.195 
For example, when a state takes actions to protect children’s constitu-
tional rights, courts ask whether the state action would be “unduly 
                                                                                                                      
189 Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. When a parent is abusive or neglectful, the presumption 
that they are acting in the best interests of their child is rebutted, and a court may act to 
override their decisions. Id. The proper application of statutes that pertain to minors 
sometimes requires courts to review parental decision-making absent evidence of abuse or 
neglect. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69–70. In these cases, courts are required to give special 
weight to parents’ decision making. See id. 
190 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. 
191 See Vincent De Francis, Termination of Parental Rights: Balancing the Eq-
uities 8–9 (1971); Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Au-
tonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 449, 455 
(1996); see infra notes 192--194 and accompanying text. 
192 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-707 (Supp. 2012) (making it a crime for an adult to 
cruelly confine or punish a child, deprive a child of necessary food, clothing, or shelter, or 
put a child in a situation where his or her mental health is at risk). Many states also have a 
mandatory reporting system for child abuse. See Thompson Reuters/West, Mandatory 
Child Abuse Reporting (Statutes) 1 (2012). 
193 De Francis, supra note 191, at 8–9. 
194 Id.; see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 37-7-146 (2012) (stating that a child has a right to a 
free, public education even if it is provided in a treatment facility). 
195 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 600, 606 (recognizing that children have constitutional 
rights, but that their rights are entwined with parental rights and their protection cannot 
unduly trench on parental rights); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 75 (1976) (analyzing whether parental rights justified a statute that restricted minor’s 
right to abortion); Howard Davidson, Children’s Rights and American Law: A Response to 
What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights, 20 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 69, 70 (2006). Although the 
United States has not ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
legal rights enumerated in it have guided legislatures and courts in upholding certain 
rights of children. See Zafran, supra note 174, at 182. 
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trenching” on the exercise of parental rights.196 The fear of infringing 
on parental rights has caused the term “children’s rights” to be omit-
ted—with few exceptions—from the titles of statutes.197 
 Children’s rights are not consistently recognized, and receive less 
attention from American courts than do parental rights.198 Although 
several states list child welfare as the primary consideration in custody 
determinations, the inconsistency of custody opinions based on similar 
facts has led some to postulate that the courts are merely claiming to 
consider the welfare of the child.199 Children’s rights are defined by a 
jumble of case law and statutes that primarily focus on protecting chil-
dren from negative adult behavior.200 These rights are often limited 
and sometimes completely disregarded at the expense of parental 
rights.201 
IV. w  
the Convent ill Protect  
the Convention.204 The majority of courts have turned to equitable toll-
     
The Settled Inquiry: Why Courts Can Follo
ion’s Text and St
Parental Rights 
 American courts can continue to place substantial focus on paren-
tal rights when considering the well-settled defense.202 But instead of 
protecting parental rights through the application of equitable tolling, 
courts should factor their concerns about parental rights into the sec-
ond prong of the well-settled defense, which asks whether the child is 
settled in his or her new environment.203 By taking this approach, 
American courts will be able to continue protecting parental rights 
while also remaining faithful to the text, drafting history, and goals of 
                                                                                                                 
196 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 606; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) 
(beginning its analysis of the constitutionality of a state statute by examining the extent to 
whi
ex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.008 
(We ”). 
 
ch it burdens the parental right to care for a child). 
197 Davidson, supra note 195, at 70. States have, however, adopted the “Children’s Bills 
of Rights” for children under the care of the state. See, e.g., T
st 2012) (listing the rights of children in “foster care
198 See supra notes 183–197 and accompanying text. 
199 See supra notes 177--182 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra notes 183--197 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra notes 185--197 and accompanying text. 
202 See infra notes 222--262 and accompanying text. 
203 See infra notes 210--262 and accompanying text. 
204 See infra notes 210--262 and accompanying text; see also Weiner, supra note 25, at 
478–79 (arguing that courts should consider concealment as part of the settled inquiry). 
The suggestions that this Note proposes are largely limited custody disputes arising out of 
countries that are Convention signatories. This is because courts are less likely to enforce 
custody orders from countries that are not signatories to the Convention. June Starr, The 
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ing to achieve this resolution even when it is clearly in conflict with the 
Convention’s text and drafting history.205 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit’s 2012 decision in Lozano v. Alvarez, and is 
scheduled to hear oral arguments on this issue in December 2013.206 
This Part explains why the Supreme Court should reject the application 
of equitable tolling and how courts should conduct the well-settled in-
quiry.207 Section A explains why the one-year period should not be ma-
nipulated through the application of equitable tolling.208 Section B then 
demonstrates how courts can protect parental rights through the well-
settled inquiry and explains why this approach should be adopted.209 
A. The One-Year Period Should Not Be Manipulated 
 When considering the Convention’s well-settled defense, courts 
should consider only the child’s best interests.210 Although important, 
deterrence of the abduction and concealment of children is not the on-
ly objective of the Convention.211 The Convention’s preamble explicitly 
provides that “the interests of children are of paramount importance in 
matters relating to their custody.”212 The defenses were included to rec-
ognize that deterrence of child abductions through the return of chil-
dren is not always in the best interests of the child.213 The Convention’s 
                                                                                                                      
Global Battlefield: Culture and International Child Custody Disputes at Century’s End, 15 Ariz. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 791, 826--27 (1998) (examining the lack of support for equitable tolling 
in the Convention’s text and drafting history). 
205 Nunez v. Ramirez, No. CV 07-01205-PHX-EHC, 2008 WL 898658, at *6 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 28, 2008); see, e.g., Font Paulus v. Vittini Cordero, No. 3:12-cv-986, 2012 WL 2524772, 
at *8 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2012); Burdett v. Liguori, No. 303CV1736P, 2003 WL 23105201, *4 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2003); Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1362 
(M.D. Fla. 2002); Bocquet v. Ouzid, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see also 
supra notes 106--120 and accompanying text (arguing that equitable tolling should not be 
read into the Convention, and that rejecting equitable tolling will not encourage child 
abductions). 
206 See Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41 (2d. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3696 ( June 
24, 2013) (No. 12-820); Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2013: For 
the Session Beginning December 2, 2013 (2013), available at http://www.supremecourt. 
gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/Monthly%20ArgumentCalDec2013.pdf. 
207 See infra notes 210--262 and accompanying text. 
208 See infra notes 210--221 and accompanying text. 
209 See infra notes 222--262 and accompanying text. 
210 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 477 (arguing that Article 12 should be read to protect 
the interests of the child). 
211 See Convention, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 1; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432; 
Weiner, supra note 25, at 475. 
212 See Convention, supra note 11, pmbl. 
213 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. 
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drafters rejected initial proposals that included extended time frames 
for cases in which a parent was found to have concealed the child’s 
whereabouts.214 Thus, the single time frame represents the drafters’ rea-
soned judgment on the best way to protect children’s interests in cases 
with prolonged abductions.215 
 Evidence supports the drafters’ belief.216 Children who have been 
living with the abducting parent for a long period of time report feeling 
a strong bond with the abducting parent.217 They also often voice anger 
and confusion toward the left-behind parent who did not come and get 
them, or may blame themselves for not making contact with the left-
behind parent.218 Further, if the children were abducted at a very young 
age, they might not even recognize the left-behind parent.219 
 The one-year limit thus functions as a recognition that abruptly 
separating the child from the abducting parent, and returning the 
child to the left-behind parent may do more harm than good.220 Thus, 
the second prong of the defense, the settled inquiry, ensures that this 
possibility is considered before the court blindly and unintentionally 
inflicts a second trauma on the child.221 
B. Reaching the Settled Inquiry Will Not Encourage Abductions 
 Even if a court finds the focus on parental rights persuasive, it 
should embrace the settled inquiry for the same policy reason that 
courts have cited in support of the application of equitable tolling: de-
terrence of child abductions through the elimination of the benefit of 
concealment.222 If the court considers the issue of whether a child is 
settled, the court can aptly regard concealment of a child as supporting 
                                                                                                                      
214 Weiner, supra note 25, at 434; see Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459; supra notes 73–75 
and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of a preliminary draft that included a 
longer time limit for cases involving concealed children). 
215 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 434–37 (describing the debate among the Conven-
tion’s drafters regarding the inclusion of a single time frame and their ultimate decision to 
adopt it). 
216 See Freeman, supra note 51, at 608–10. 
217 Id. at 609. 
218 Id. at 608. 
219 Id. at 610. 
220 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458 (noting that the one-year time limit functions as a 
recognition that return of a child might not be in the child’s best interests after the child 
has become settled); see Convention, supra note 11, art. 12. 
221 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459 (noting that the settled inquiry is largely un-
guided, and thus left to the discretion of the court hearing the petition); Weiner, supra 
note 25, at 485 (noting that the settled inquiry allows for more meaningful review). 
222 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 456--57. 
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a finding that the child is not settled.223 In this way, although the abduct-
ing parent may have opened up a possible defense through conceal-
ment, the parent’s actions may demonstrate that the child is not “set-
tled.”224 This would essentially eliminate the benefit of concealment, 
and therefore discourage a parent from taking such a drastic action.225 
 Courts should have little difficultly in using the fact that the child 
was abducted and concealed as evidence that the child is not well set-
tled.226 In fact, courts have already adopted a similar approach when 
denying abductors’ claims to the defense that the child objects to the 
return.227 Children who are abducted for long periods of time and are 
isolated are more likely to express a preference for remaining with the 
abducting parent.228 Thus, the cases involving this defense often in-
volve competing tensions similar to the ones present for the well-settled 
defense---namely, the desire to follow the text of the Convention versus 
the desire to prevent an abducting parent from benefitting from con-
cealing the child.229 In response to this tension, courts have held that 
                                                                                                                      
223 See id. at 456--57; see also Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that the court should consider any active measures taken to conceal the child in determin-
ing whether the child is settled). 
224 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 457 (discussing how weighing concealment as a factor 
against return discourages concealment). 
225 See id. (discussing how weighing concealment as a factor against return discourages 
concealment). 
226 See infra notes 227--233 and accompanying text. 
227 See, e.g., Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 06-CV-2548, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5 
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2007) (noting that a mother’s attempt to isolate her child during his 
early childhood in the United States diminished the credibility of the child’s stated prefer-
ence to remain in the United States); Gonzalez v. Nashor Lurashi, No. Civ.04-1276(HL), 
2004 WL 1202729, at *5 (D.P.R. May 20, 2004) (noting that the child’s objection to return 
is not conclusive because he had been isolated from the left-behind mother and sister for 
over a year and was heavily influenced by the abductor); see also Weiner, supra note 25, at 
456–57 (mentioning the use of concealment as a factor in determining the weight that 
should be given to a child’s preferences under other Convention defenses). 
228 See Freeman, supra note 51, at 609; see also supra notes 217–219 and accompanying text 
(discussing the effects of abduction on a child’s perceptions of the left-behind parent). 
229 Compare Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 280 (3rd Cir. 2007) (noting 
that the child’s objection to return stemmed from years of wrongful retention, and there-
fore concluding that allowing the abductor to claim this as a defense would reward the 
abductor’s wrongful acts), with Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 
1363 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that the well-settled defense was only available because a 
wrongful retention lasted for more than a year, and concluding that allowing the defense 
would serve to reward that parent’s misconduct). 
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concealment decreases the weight that should be given to a child’s 
preference to remain with the abductor.230 
 For example, one court reasoned that a child’s objection should 
not be accorded great weight when the abducting parent had suc-
ceeded in isolating the child for an extended period of time.231 Implicit 
in the court’s reasoning was that the boy could not reasonably be ex-
pected to prefer his habitual residence and the left-behind parent when 
he had not seen either for over a year, and had only limited communi-
cation with the left-behind parent during that time.232 The court em-
phasized that the abducting parent’s efforts to isolate the child specifi-
cally spoke to an undue influence over the child’s opinion.233 
 The judicial approach to the child’s objection demonstrates a will-
ingness to enter into fact-sensitive inquiries.234 Courts already analyze a 
child’s age and maturity to determine how much weight should be giv-
en to the child’s preference to remain with the abducting parent.235 If 
the child is of sufficient age and maturity, the court may---but does not 
have an obligation to---refuse to order return based solely on the objec-
tion.236 Courts thus have to engage in a second fact-sensitive inquiry to 
determine the proper weight of the child’s objection.237 Courts faced 
                                                                                                                      
 
230 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 456 (citing Wasniewski, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5); supra 
note 227 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts gave less weight to a 
child’s preference because the abducting parent isolated the child). 
231 See Wasniewski, 2007 WL 2344760, at *1, *5. 
232 See id. 
233 Id. at *5; see also Appendix C—Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on Civil As-
pects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986) (not-
ing that a child’s objection to return should be accorded little weight where it is the prod-
uct of the parent’s undue influence). 
234 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 456; see, e.g., Wasniewski, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5; Tsai-
Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, No. 2:03-cv-1613, 2006 WL 2466095, at *15–17 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
25, 2006), aff’d 499 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2007); Gonzalez, 2004 WL 1202729, at *5. 
235 See Wasniewski, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5 (finding that child was not of adequate age 
or maturity to support refusing his return because the child had a level of maturity slightly 
less than one would expect of a thirteen-year-old boy, his objection to his return was too 
general, and the abducting parent had isolated him and exhibited a high level of influence 
over the child’s decisions). Because there is no age cut-off at which courts should not con-
sider a child’s preference, courts must engage in a fact-specific inquiry to determine how 
much weight should be given to the child’s preference based on the child’s age and matur-
ity. See Convention, supra note 11, art. 13; see also Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 433 (noting 
that all attempts to determine a minimum age for this defense had failed because any sug-
gested age seemed arbitrary). 
236 de Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007). Courts more closely scrutinize 
the child’s age and maturity when the child’s objection is the sole defense to return. See id. 
237 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2004 WL 1202729, at *5 (noting that the child had reached an age 
and maturity at which it was proper to take into account his objection, but diminishing the 
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with the child’s objection have noted that spending a longer time with 
the abducting parent, especially in isolation if the child is concealed, 
can unfairly influence a child’s preference to remain with the abduct-
ing parent.238 Thus, the courts already have engaged in fact-sensitive 
inquiries that measure how concealment of the child should affect the 
weight given to the child’s objection to remain with the abducting par-
ent.239 
 Without tolling the one-year time period, the well-settled defense, 
just like the child’s objection defense, provides little guidance to cabin a 
court’s discretion.240 Accordingly, courts will have to analyze various 
facts to determine whether a child is well settled.241 Despite similar is-
sues facing courts in confronting the child objection defense, courts 
have proven that they are willing to jump into the mire of a largely un-
guided factual inquiry.242 This inquiry will allow courts to weigh con-
cealment when considering whether to apply the defense, just as courts 
have been willing and able to when considering the child objection de-
tled.245 These courts analyze the stability of the abducting parent’s life-
fense.243 
 Furthermore, the finding that the petition was filed after the one-
year period does not necessarily mean the child is settled.244 Courts that 
have addressed the settled inquiry often find that concealed children---
even if they have been in the country for more than a year---are not set-
                                                                                                                      
significance of the objection because the child had been heavily influenced by the abduc-
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60, at *5; Tsai-Yi Yang, 2006 WL 2466095, at *15--
17; 
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while isolated from the left-behind mother and sister for more than a year). 
238 See, e.g., Wasniewski, 2007 WL 23447
Gonzalez, 2004 WL 1202729, at *5. 
239 See, e.g., Wasniewski, 2007 WL 23447
Gonzalez, 2004 WL 1202729, at *5. 
240 See Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 433 (noting that the child’s objection as an excep-
tion to return does not contain an age minimum, and the application of the exception is 
left to the discretion of the authority making the return determinatio
 there is nothing in the Convention to guide the settled inquiry). 
241 See, e.g., Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. at 1348--49 (holding that the one-year period should 
be equitably tolled, but using a number of factors t
t that the one-year period should not be tolled). 
242 See, e.g., Wasniewski, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5;Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1361--62. 
243 See, e.g., Wasniewski, 2007 WL 23447
Gonzalez, 2004 WL 1202729, at *5. 
244 See, e.g., Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348--49. 
245 See, e.g., Fernandez-Trejo v. Alvarez-Hernandez, No. 8:12-cv-02634-EAK-TBM, 2012 WL 
6106418, at *3--4 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Burdett, 2003 WL 23105201, at *4; Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1348--49. But see Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561--64 (D. Md. 2003) (noting that 
a child was well settled and applying equitable tolling to make the well-settled defense un-
available to the abductor). Because of the uncertainty surrounding whether equitable tolling 
should apply, several lower courts have held that equitable tolling applies, and then gone on 
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style and employment and whether the child has established family, 
community, and school ties.246 An abducting parent who is attempting 
to conceal a child may isolate the child from the community, move res-
idences several times, switch schools, or attempt other similar tactics.247 
Courts that have addressed the settled inquiry have already used these 
facts to find that a child was not settled.248 Moreover, some courts have 
explicitly weighed active measures taken to conceal the child against a 
finding that the child is settled.249 
 The Supreme Court should reject the use of equitable tolling, and 
instead instruct lower courts to reach the settled inquiry as part of an 
analysis that is more faithful to the text and purposes of the Conven-
tion, and still protects parental rights by deterring child abductions.250 
 The Court should embrace the settled inquiry as a way to remain 
faithful to the text of the Convention.251 The inquiry is an explicit part 
of the Convention’s text that should be addressed if the child was 
wrongfully removed or retained over a year before the commencement 
of proceedings.252 As previously acknowledged by the Supreme Court, 
uniformity in interpretation of this Convention is of particular impor-
tance because international cooperation is one of the Convention’s 
fundamental aspects.253 Adhering to the Convention’s text by reaching 
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d was not well settled. See, e.g., Alvarez-Fernandez, 2012 WL 6106418, at *3--4; Burdett, 2003 
WL 23105201, at *4; Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348--49. 
246 In re Ahumada Ca
 Alvarez-Fernandez, 2012 WL 6106418, at *4; Burdett, 2003 WL 23105201, at *4; Bocquet, 
225 F. Supp. 2d at 1349. 
247 See, e.g., Alvarez-Fernandez, 2012 WL 6106418, at *4 (noting that the child had lived 
in three different homes in fifteen months); Giampaolo v. Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 
1282 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (noting that the child had lived in three different homes and at-
tended three different schools in two years); Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (noting 
that the children had lived in seven different homes in almost a year-and-a-half and the 
abducting parent prevented contact with the left-behind parent); Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1349--50 (no
 had not attended school, a play group, a religious institution, or participated on any 
sports team). 
248 See, e.g., Alvarez-Fernandez, 2012 WL 6106418, at *4; Burdett, 2003 WL
Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1349. 
249 See, e.g., Lops, 140 F.3d at 946; Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. 
250 See infra notes 251--26
251 See supra notes 106--120 and accompa
ory of the Convention). 
252 See Convention, supra note 11, art. 12. 
253 See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (noting that uniform interpretation is of 
particular importance for the Convention). The Convention relies on the cooperation of 
member states to ensure the achievement of 
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the settled inquiry will help courts to ensure such uniformity of inter-
pretation among all jurisdictions.254 
 The settled inquiry also gives courts an opportunity to ensure that 
the child’s interests are truly of paramount importance as required by 
the Convention.255 The Convention’s drafters acknowledged the im-
portance of deterrence, and that the prompt return of abducted chil-
dren would serve that function.256 The drafters felt that, in general, 
prompt return was in the child’s best interest.257 They acknowledged, 
however, that such a prompt return might not be in the child’s interest 
when a child had become settled in his or her new environment.258 In 
rejecting an extended time period for children who were concealed, 
the drafters expressed a preference for keeping the child with the ab-
ducing parent—and thereby avoiding the retraumatization of the child 
through a second abrupt removal—even if this encouraged abductors 
to hide their children for an extended period of time.259 
 Finally, the Court should embrace the settled inquiry as an oppor-
tunity to deter child abduction and protect the rights of left-behind 
parents.260 Just as courts have already done in cases involving children’s 
objections to return, courts should engage the fact-sensitive settled in-
quiry and consider concealment as a factor against allowing the child 
to stay with the abducting parent.261 This approach allows the court to 
negate any benefit of concealment, and thus ensure that protecting 
parental rights remains a central concern.262 
Conclusion 
 In adopting equitable tolling when considering the well-settled 
defense, American courts have placed the deterrence of child abduc-
                                                                                                                      
fully removed children; and (2) respect for the rights of custody and access in a member 
state. Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 435. 
254 See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16 (emphasizing the importance of a uniform interpretation 
of the Convention’s text). 
255 See Convention, supra note 11, pmbl. 
256 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 429. 
257 Id. at 431--32. 
258 Id. at 458. 
259 See id. at 458–59; supra notes 121--132 and accompanying text (discussing the pur-
poses of the Convention). 
260 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 478--79; supra notes 222--249 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 222--243 and accompanying text (discussing how courts weigh con-
cealment against the child’s desire to stay with the abducting parent). 
262 See supra notes 227--239 and accompanying text (noting that weighing concealment 
against keeping the child with the abducting parent will eliminate the possible benefit of 
raising an Article 12 defense). 
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, and avoid reward-
g p
ttled inquiry could thus 
become just another refuge for the same bias. 
Nicole Fontaine 
tions, and thus the custody rights of the left-behind parent, above all 
other considerations. In doing so, they have ignored the text, drafting 
history, and underlying purposes of the Convention. As shown by the 
reasoning underlying their application of equitable tolling, these courts 
have placed undue importance on the interests of the parent to the 
detriment of the child’s interests. This approach mirrors the overall 
emphasis on parental rights in American law that limits and sometimes 
overrides children’s rights and interests. Instead of using this approach, 
the courts should pursue deterrence through the well-settled inquiry by 
weighing abduction and concealment against a finding that the child is 
settled. This approach will allow courts to adhere to the text of the 
Convention, properly emphasize children’s interests
in arents who abduct and conceal their children. 
  Because there is little guidance in the Convention on how to con-
duct the settled inquiry, courts could potentially reach the settled in-
quiry and still continue to allow parental rights to dominate their anal-
ysis of whether the child is settled. If the Supreme Court determines 
that equitable tolling should not apply, the se
